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CLINICAL SECTION
TWO CONTRADICTORY CRITICISMS OF CLINICAL
EDUCATION: DILEMMAS AND DIRECTIONS IN
LAWYERING EDUCATION*
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOWt

INTRODUCTION

This Article reviews what legal education is attempting to accomplish in teaching lawyering skills and where, from my perspective as a
clinician, I think it has fallen short. I then offer some suggestions for
what both clinicians and nonclinicians might do to further our efforts
directed at truly educating lawyers.
The two critiques I will offer of clinical education derive from two of
clinical education's principal goals-teaching students how to "behave"
as well as "think" like a lawyer (a behavorist goal), and teaching our
students to think more broadly about the purpose of their roles as lawyers in the larger society (a social critic's goal). All clinicians do a little
of both and some non-clinicians claim to pay some attention to these
issues, but there are ways we have fallen short of making the most of
these pedagogical goals.
I approach this topic as a friendly critic. I believe clinical education
is one of the most important contributions to legal education since 1870
(in my view rivaled only by Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studiesperhaps in other's views by law and economics).' Clinical education provides the flesh on the bones of legal education. It is in clinical courses
that students learn about law on many levels-substantive doctrine; the
animating policy or set of political concerns behind the doctrines; the
process by which the law is enacted, enforced, and influential on actors in
the legal world; the failures of the law to achieve all that it is intended to
achieve; how the law operates in action (the "gaps" between the law on
the books and the law in reality as the socio-legal movement describes
* This Article is derived from a talk delivered at New York University Law School at the
Society of American Law Teachers Conference on Life in the Law School on December 16, 1982.
The author was a participant in a panel on Clinical Education and Lawyering Education.
t Carrie Menkel-Meadow is Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of
Law.
See Menkel-Meadow, "Too Little Theory, Too Little Practice: Stevens' Law School", 1985
AM. B. F. Ras. J. 675 for different perspectives on what the most influential forces on legal education have been.
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what lawyers can accomplish in the world and what they cannot-in
short, it teaches more about the legal world than any other single course
or area of study. Because clinical teachers and students are exposed to
law on so many different levels in the context of legal education, and not
exclusively from the position of being in practice, they can reflect on the
various meanings of all these different levels on which law is experienced,
as constraint or as a source of empowerment.
Indeed, it is the self-reflectiveness of clinical legal education that offers the hope of changing some of legal education's traditional
pedagogy-by focusing on performance and by exposing the self and
others to constant critique and feedback. This form of criticism-self-criticism is perhaps best illustrated by my favorite lightbulb joke:
Question: How many legal clinicians does it take to change a light
bulb?
Answer: Four-one to change the lightbulb, one to critique the
changing of the lightbulb, one to critique the critique
and yet a fourth to critique the critique of the critique.
It is this constant self-reflection and critique on several simultaneous
levels-objectives, performance, analysis, social role, effect on others and
learning-that provides the particular contributions and strengths of
3
clinical education.
So, I embark on the clinical legal educator's favorite activity-selfcriticism, a critique of clinical education. Good as I think we are, we can
and should be even better and should apply the same searching analysis
to ourselves as teachers that we ask our students to apply to themselves
as lawyers. Good critiques emerge from a clear set of principles or goals
about what one is trying to accomplish, so we return to the goals stated
at the outset in order to measure our effectiveness.
it)2;

THE GOALS OF CLINICAL EDUCATION

First, when we teach lawyering we are concerned with teaching
those things which lawyers do, of which "thinking like a lawyer" (analysis) is only one part. Included in this teaching of lawyering skills is the
teaching judgment, decision-making, interpersonal skills, the interaction
of legal and non-legal factors in making legal decisions (both from the
lawyer's and the client's perspective), and the constituent elements of
lawyering tasks-question-framing, listening, drafting, persuading, fact
2 See, e.g., Galanter, "Presidential Address: Legal Malaise or Justice Observed" 19 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 537 (1985); Abel, "Law Books and Books About Law", 26 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1973).
3 Bellow, "On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as
Methodology" in CLEPR, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
A SERVING SETTING, (1973).
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gathering, synthesizing and marshalling information, investigating, problem-solving and advising, to name a few. 4 Elsewhere I have called these
the "micro" aspects of lawyering. 5
Second, we are concerned with teaching our students to think about
the uses to which they will put their newly acquired skills-what are the
purposes or ends behind their lawyering? What do/should lawyers do
I have, in
with their skills-what is their larger social purpose, 6 what
7
another context, called the "macro" aspects of lawyering.
I will examine each in turn below.
"SKILLS" TRAINING

When we teach skills, we aim to develop at least a minimal level of
competancy in those essential lawyering tasks that lawyers perform (interviewing, counseling, fact investigation, negotiation, advocacy and
transaction planning). To this I add the goal of making "better" lawyers.
That is, most clinical teachers do not conceive of themselves as mere
agents of socialization or assimilation to the profession as currently practiced. Why not resort to the apprentice system if that is our goal? Instead, what the clinician aims to do is to study lawyering skills so that
students can be taught to be the "best" (most effective) lawyer possible,
which may require the creation and development of "new" norms, values
and practices. Thus, good clinical teaching is not just descriptive drill, it
is explicity normative, and the debate about from where the norms are
derived provides some of the most interesting scholarship and teaching in
the field. 8
Teaching skills also involves demonstrating the relationship of doctrine and substantive law and process to the practice of lawyering skills.
This is one place I think we have fallen short. In the context of teaching
about how each lawyering act is done, we have the opportunity, if not the
4 Clinicians have been active in the development and training for new lawyering skills like mediation and other forms of non-adversary representation. See e.g. AAA Task Force on Teaching
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Law and Business Schools.
5 Menkel-Meadow, "The Legacy of Clinical Legal Education: Theories About Lawyering" 29
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980).
6 See Bok, "A Flawed System" HARVARD MAGAZINE 38 (May-June 1983).
7 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5.
8 See e.g., the debates in negotiation theory such as White, "The Pros and Cons of Getting To
Yes" 34 J. OF LEG. ED. 115 (1984) and Fisher, Response, 34 J. OF LEGAL ED. 120 (1984); MenkelMeadow, "Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving" 31
UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Gifford, "A Context Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation" 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985) in which opposed views of the goals of legal negotiation and the
world in which negotiation skills are practiced have led to different teaching models of negotiation
skills. See also the different approaches to trial advocacy in the various trial advocacy texts, e.g. T.

Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques (1980), Bergman, Trial Advocacy ina Nutshell (1979);
Tanford, The Trial Process (1983).
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responsibility, to understand the political, economic and social foundations and structures of the rule systems that our students will be working
with when they are lawyers. To think about what the rule is and from
where it is derived is an essential "skill" of being a lawyer. What political forces caused a particular rule to be dominant where several possible
formulations were contested? 9 How do the lawyer's activities influence
the making and changing of rules? One could look, for example, for the
lawyer's creativity in crafting new causes of action as a "skill", responsive to particular client's needs which result in vast changes in rule systems (products liability, discrimination cases, warranty of habitability, to
name a few).
We also, in teaching skills, seek to understand and teach about the
interpersonal aspects of lawyering-the affective as well as cognitive aspects of lawyering. What are the client's (and lawyer's) feelings about a
particular situation? In making judgments about whether to choose a
particular course of action-how do non-legal factors influence decisions-social, psychological, moral, political, ethical and economic
dimensions to individual client's problems (or group or state clients) that
may overwhelm the legal considerations law students become familiar
10
with in their non-clinical courses?
Finally, in teaching lawyering skills, clinicians have been concerned
with understanding the criteria by which lawyering work should be evaluated so that reflective clinical students as lawyers will continue to learn
about lawyering when they leave our programs. These criteria are derived from our study of and reflection on our practices t ' and on our theories of practice.

12

In teaching these lawyering "skills", many clinicians have replicated, perhaps unwittingly, what we find most distasteful about the nonclinical classroom. Let us examine a "typical" clinical class in client interviewing as an example. An instructor begins with suggesting four or
five objectives of a client interview: learning the facts, learning what the
client's "problem" is, developing rapport with the client, establishing a
relationship with the client and developing some agreement about what's
going to happen in the remainder of the lawyer-client relationship (the
lawyer will draft a pleading, the client will bring documentary evidence
9 See e.g., Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977), for a discussion
of how the processes of industrialization and capitalization linked with political ties to the legal
system (judges and lawyers) produced particular "rules" in protection of particular industries.
10 1 use the term "non-clinical" instead of traditional or "regular" law school classes to demonstrate how labels we use in legal education set the agenda by describing what is central or "core" to
the enterprise and what is "peripheral."
1 See D. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner(1983).
12 Spiegel, "Theory and Practice" UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming).
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and the names of witnesses). These objectives might be stated in lecture
form, derived from student discussion (socratic or otherwise) or elicited
deductively from a critique of a student performance, or from a previously assigned text on interviewing. 13 A videotape of a client interview
typically will be shown to students and students will be asked questions
like-"What's wrong with this interview?", "Has this lawyer developed
rapport with his client?", "How effectively has the lawyer learned the
facts" or "Are there more effective ways of doing this?"
If this is an accurate description of such a class, what does such a
class produce? By such a methodology (not unlike parsing an appellate
case in the non-clinical classes) we teach students to develop a critical
analysis of interviewing. They learn how to articulate critiques and to
formulate arguments about what is a good interview and what is a bad
interview. Students learn to recognize and label what went wrong in the
interview. They may even learn conceptually what a good interview may
look like. But have they learned anything to prepare them to conduct or
perform their own good interview? Have they learned anything about
what general principles may apply in most, if not, all legal interviews?
Has the student learned anything but that each student and teacher (and
probably each lawyer) has his or her own idiosyncratic criteria for performing and judging an interview? 14 In this sense, we do no differently
than our non-clinical colleagues who teach conceptual analysis-the taking apart and critique of what is. Does an ability to analyze and critique
a performance (or a judicial opinion) mean that a student can describe,
understand and demonstrate behaviorally how to conduct a good and
effective interview? I think not. Our analytic methods may be useful for
our scholarship-for our thinking about what an interview does consist
of and what, perhaps, it ought to consist of, but I think it does not permit
us to evaluate ourselves very highly in terms of teaching lawyering skills
to students in a way that we can be confident of their ability to perform
consistently well on a behavioral level.
What might we do instead of this analytic, critical, negative teaching? We can use synthetic, positive "models" of lawyering which students can be taught to "master" at the same time that they are taught to
13 D. Binder & S. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client CenteredApproach (1979);
G. Bellow & B. Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Materialsfor Clinical Instruction in Advocacy
(1978); T. Shaffer, Legal Interviewing and Counseling (1976); Schoenfield & Schoenfield, Interviewing
and Counseling in a Legal Setting (1981).
14 Although it is beyond the scope of this essay, I might mention that some of this critique of
clinical education applies as well to lawyer education programs such as the NITA Trial Advocacy
college, where too often critique of performances is based on idiosyncracies of the critiquers and
seldom on a general conceptual framework. What do students of such programs take back from
such programs except fleeting memories of what Lawyer X, Judge Y or Professor Z said about their
cross-examinations.
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critically evaluate the models. In the clinical program at UCLA we
teach our students to be lawyers with the use of explicit, positive models
of interviewing, counseling, fact investigation, negotiation and questioning and argumentation in trial advocacy.15 Lawyering skills are broken
down into component parts and students do not progress from one stage
until they have "mastered" it. Thus, to use an example from Binder &
Price's Legal Interviewing and Counseling text, students are taught Preliminary Problem Identification, Preparatory Explanation, Chronological Fact Development and Theory Development and Verification in
separate units, with role-play exercises that are designed to teach mastery
of each aspect of legal interviewing. Once a mastery of the model has
been achieved so that there is at least a minimal level of competance and
comfort with lawyering, the model can be critiqued for when it does not
work (such as in child custody litigation, for example, where the chronology is too long and legally "irrelevant," and non-litigation matters such
as estate planning where (topical rather than chronological order may be
more efficient and effective)). Students and teachers together can test the
models for effectiveness in accomplishing particular legal tasks, both
against standards in the present world and against standards which attempt to change and improve legal practice.
Teaching with models presents its own difficulties. From where are
they derived? Thus far, most "models" used in clinical legal education
have been developed from our work as clinical scholars studying what
lawyering skills consist of and what they ought to consist of-both an
empirically descriptive and theoretically normative perspective. Some of
our models have been derived from observing and interviewing lawyers, 16
others from theoretical work in other disciplines 17 and still others from
analysis of the lawyer's tasks under a microscope.' 8 These models are
suggestive and tentative; they require testing, validation in the world of
practice, and as theoretical constructs that help us understand our world.
They evolve as we work with them and modify them. 19
15 These models are based on Binder & Price, supra note 13; D. Binder and P. Bergman, Fact
Investigation (1984); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8; Bergman, supra note 8; A. Moore, "Analyzing
Circumstantial Evidence" (forthcoming, mms on file with author).
16 See e.g. D. Binder & C. MenkeI-Meadow, ABA Lawyering Skills Program (1982), MenkelMeadow & Ntephe, "Clients Are People Too-or Are They?" 10 BARRISTER 12 (1983).
17 See the influence of game theory and Pareto economics on my work on negotiation, MenkelMeadow, supra note 8 and Menkel-Meadow, "Strategies in Search of A Theory: Legal Negotiation"
1983 AM. B. F. RES. J. 901 and others', e.g. H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982).
IS See e.g. Binder & Bergman, supra note 15.
19 Recently, one of my former students, now a practicing attorney, read what I had written
about legal negotiation. "That's not what you taught us", she said. How can we explain or perhaps
conduct the "continuing education" of ourselves as well as of our former students who are, in some
sense, the guinea pigs in these exciting new ways to learn about lawyering?"
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Teaching from models is a controversial suggestion in legal
pedagogy. There is an authoritarian conception of what ought to be in
an interview, in a negotiation session-how will the student learn to
think on his own (the reigning pedagogical justification for socratic dialogue)? Yet in my experience, students are so unable to translate their
fine conceptual understandings into behavior that some authoritarian
"drill" (like those my junior high school French teacher used to give) is
the only way to teach the minimal level of competence that permits the
student enough self-confidence to begin to ask questions of the model.
For me it has been particularly useful to "innoculate" students
against what I perceive to be the destructive and counterproductive ways
most legal disputes are resolved by today's lawyers. 20 In teaching students to be proactive problem-solving negotiators, rather than exclusively
competitive adversarial negotiators, 2 I a clear and positive model helps
them to do, rather than simply critique, the perceived prevalent competitive model. More importantly, they may learn the greater complexity of
analyzing when a particular model may be appropriate in a particular
context.22 Students can learn the "adversarial" model equally well when
it is juxtaposed to an affirmative and provocative presentation of the
"problem-solving" model. Indeed, at some schools whole courses are
taught from this one model, 23 at other schools both models may be
taught together to clarify and teach both the conceptual material and the
behavioral analogues. Models can be taught in both simulation courses
and real-client contexts; the former permits a better opportunity, perhaps, for creating models by mimicing the "controlled" environment of
the laboratory where one variable at a time can be manipulated, the latter
a better location for testing the validity and effectiveness of models in
actual legal practice. In my experience, both lend themselves to the "reflective practice" that creates theories about lawyering.
Thus, the replication of critical question-asking in the clinical curriculum (I was once called a "Socratic questionner hiding in clinical
clothing" by a student) focuses our classes, like more traditional classes,
on the tearing down, analytic, critical aspects of lawyering which are
taught quite well in the rest of the curriculum. What clinicians out to do,
in my view, is something else, pedagogically richer, perhaps more difficult, but ultimately teaching and learning of a different order. The use of
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8.
The students may be wrong about their perception of the prevalence of the "competitive"
model of negotiation, see G. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement (1983), Ch. 2.
22 For excellent efforts to do this sort of analysis see Lowenthal, "A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behavior" 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69 (1982) and Gifford, supra note 8.
23 See e.g. Harvard Negotiation Workshop, Harvard Law School, taught from R. Fisher & W.
Ury, Getting To Yes (1981).
20
21
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models not only offers students the possibility of learning for achievement and accomplishment and the confidence that enhances all learning,
but also should foster more interesting clinical scholarship-studying
what lawyers do, why they do what they do, creating new frameworks
for lawyering activity that in the applied research sense may improve the
ways lawyers do their work.
There are implications in this for non-clinical teaching as well. In
my work on negotiation, the development of a new negotiation model
reinforced the importance of substantive doctrine as one of the tools of
legal problem solving. Students who attempted to master the components of problem solving returned to their property, contracts, business
associations and taxation courses with a renewed interest in understanding how disputes are resolved and transactions are planned. They came
to understand that their lawyer's skill in putting transactions together
(planning "around and with" rules) would be used in different ways than
the lawyer's skill of arguing from rules for the doctrinal issues used by
judges to "decide" cases. These realizations can be tapped in traditional
classes. Students can be asked to put things together as well as take them
apart-drafting contracts, writing procedural rules, planning transactions and the old favorite used on traditional exams-drafting an opinion
to demonstrate issue-spotting skills as well as the elements of decisionmaking, policymaking and the written craft. Thus, even in the traditional class the interplay of doctrine, the skill of decision-making and the
political constructs from which law is made can be explored in exercises
that are designed to do more than simply "analyze" from a given text.
THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN SOCIETY

When we turn to our goals in teaching about lawyering from a
broader, macro perspective we have the following subjects in mind:
What is the lawyer's role in an adversary system, vis a vis her client, her
adversary, the rest of the profession and the legal system? We are concerned with professional responsibility and ethics, both in the descriptive
sense of defining what are professional responsibilities and roles, and in
the prescriptive and normative senses of what we think they ought to be.
We also use clinical teaching to examine how the law in action actually operates (i.e. how does it affect the regulated, how does its rules
penetrate social action) and to examine the values which underlie the
substantive rules of our legal system (i.e. what value choices are made
when we "prefer" process over result, in "assigning" burdens of proof).
We are concerned with examining how decisions are made in the
legal system. How does a lawyer make each decision? How and when
does the client become involved? How and when does the other side
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(lawyer and client) become involved in decisions which affect us? How
do juries find facts? How do judges decide questions of law? (This is, of
course, the stuff of which traditional classes are made, but it also should
be part of the clinical curriculum to "deconstruct" judicial decision-making from the advocate's perspective). 24 What clinical education can do is
focus attention on the myriad of decision makers who don't make it into
the traditional curriculum-the Social Security Administrative Law
Judge, the legislative committee, the bureaucrat who grants or denies
thousands of government-dependent benefits and those who enforce the
law (police officers, social workers, probation officers and other law functionaries we seldom encounter in the conventional legal curriculum).
How do these "law-makers" in the non-traditional sense decide when to
take action and when not to? In short, what can we study and teach
about the law and legal system by focusing on the decisions of the human
beings who make up the legal structure?
Finally, what is the role of law and lawyers in society? How do
lawyers facilitate what our clients and society hope to accomplish? How,
more commonly in our consciousness, do lawyers, law and its institutions
make more difficult the resolution of our client's and society's problems
and needs?
To respond to these questions may require us to step away from
teaching lawyering models, and so my second criticism of clinical legal
education is somewhat contradictory, or at least, takes us in a different
direction. For if we were to satisfy the first set of goals of clinical education, that is, the teaching of lawyering skills, would we be doing anything
different from our traditional colleagues in creating technicians of a very
narrow craft? To focus on skills, models might also continue the narrow
ways in which legal problems are conceived and solved. And, in creating
conceptual and behavioral models of lawyering wouldn't there be the
danger of creating conceptual frameworks in the ivory tower, away from
the main action?
For those who supervise their students in court, how is it explained
when the judge makes a snap judgment without listening to the testimony or legal arguments, after ten classes on the models of "rational"
decision making? How does a model of judicial decision-making play
itself out in the family courts or municipal courts of Chicago, Philadelphia, New York or Los Angeles, where judicial appointments may be
made on the basis of political connections and the judge who is sitting
has little interest or expertise in the cases assigned to him? Will our
models or skills training help students function in such environments?
24

See Kennedy, "The Phenomenology of Judging'

(forthcoming,

TELOS).
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What can we do in law school to teach about the social, political, and
psychological and other non-doctrinal aspects of the legal system in
which our students must practice?
To the extent that clinicians are trying to carry the ball that the
Legal Realists set rolling, to see how the law in action operates, we have
fallen short in our efforts to explain and have our students understand
the bigger world in which they function as lawyers. Learning skills is
simply not enough to become an effective, savvy, knowledgeable and intelligent lawyer. We could be doing a much better job of studying and
teaching about the lower courts, administrative agencies and other bodies
our clients confront in their daily lives. Students should be able to understand that the reason child abuse cases are being increasingly shuttled
into mandatory settlement conferences is because fiscal cutbacks have reduced not only judicial resources, but the ancillary court services and
crucial social work services that support the system. What effect do fiscal difficulties and social service unionization (i.e. demands for lower
caseloads) have on the law that is enforced and made in such legal arenas? Where non-clinicians may err on the side of disembodied abstractions, clinicians must labor to move from the concrete to deeper and
more macro-social and legal understandings of what patterns produce
the cases they handle. Some clinician-scholars are engaged in this sort of
work. Bill Simon, for example, has studied the impact of bureaucratization of the welfare system on the welfare law that is practiced by poverty
lawyers and welfare workers who administer the programs that benefit
25
and burden our clients.
Clinicians may discuss such issues in seminars, in individual supervisory sessions, but have failed to capture in any useful way a social and
political structural analysis of the legal worlds in which students operate.
The sociology of the lower courts has been researched and described, for
the most part, by non-clinician, sociolegal scholars active in the law and
society movement. 26 Without such analysis, our models and our skills
training may become more and more rarified and removed from the real
and varied world in which our students will practice. If we don't attempt
to understand and teach about the context in which law practice occurs,
our classes will look no different from those in the rest of the curriculum,
25 W. Simon, "Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System" 92 YALE L.J. 1198

(1983); and J. Marshaw, BureaucraticJustice (1981), a description of the relationship of process to
substantive outcomes in social security disability cases. See also D. Rivkin, "Petty Disturbances":
Lawyering, Power and Reform" (forthcoming, mss on file with author) for one clinician's analysis of
the political and social forces behind the legal efforts to deal with mining rights in Kentucky.
26 See e.g. P. Utz, Settling the Facts (1978); M. Feeley, The Process is the Punishment: Handling
Cases in the Lower CriminalCourts (1979) for description of the relationship of rules, court personnel, customs and "routines" on what "really" happens in the courts.
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but our failure will be greater because of our promise to provide the tools
of understanding the "real" legal world.
There are many ways to undertake this study. The potential of
clinical education to unite worlds of theory and practice is great. Clinicians can use real cases for their analysis but must learn to travel up and
down the levels of generalization-moving from the concrete to the abstract and more general and back again. Larger questions must be asked.
Why are these the only remedies that are available here? Why is the
burden of proof established in this way? What classes of litigants are
helped/hurt by these particular rules? 27 Why do "the rules of evidence

not apply" before this particular administrative agency? Why are certain
types of cases relegated to summary proceedings? Why do lawyers conceive of their role as "winning" legal cases rather than solving social or
legal problems?
Clinicians could learn to use "case rounds" the way medical education uses "rounds." We study the individual client's (patient's) problem
not only to achieve proper diagnosis and treatment, but also to analyze
the symptomology so we will recognize the same disease next time and
perhaps so that we may come closer to understanding the legal/medical
mechanisms and perhaps come closer to a cure. Like the epidemiologist
who looks for patterns in diseases to locate the source, the clinician can
use case rounds to discover patterns, sources and causes of legal
trouble.

28

Outside of the clinical curriculum, non-clinicians interested in furthering lawyering education can also employ a more rigorous historical
and social structural analysis of the cases they teach, such as in the per29
sonalized case history of the Palsgrafcase presented by John Noonan.
It is important for students to understand the contextual reality of the
cases they read about. In teaching the case of Morgan v. Morgan,30 in
which a New York judge held that a husband has some obligation,
whether equitable or contractual, to provide equivalent financial support
for a wife who supported him through professional school, I asked the
27 Here the recent example of proposed revisions to Rule 68, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. is illustrative.
Proposals to tax the failure to settle may burden civil rights cases in ways different from purely
monetary cases.
28 Although it is beyond the scope of this essay, it might be useful to reassess the similarities and
differences of medical and legal clinical education. I spent 48 hours on a "typical" tour of duty with
an intern in order to learn first hand what aspects of medical education might usefully be transported
to clinical legal education. In fact, much of medical clinical education combines the best of traditional legal education (socratic questionning, but in smaller working groups) with clinical education
(focus on analyzing a "real" case).
29 J. Noonan, Persons and Masks of the Law (1976) p. 111-51.
30 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S. 2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modified 52 A. 2d 804, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 343

(1976).
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plaintiff (a personal friend) to discuss her experience with the case. To
students, this case is important as a classic "textbook" case in its modification of doctrine and its attempt to break new legal ground. It created a
significant rule of law, with important policy implications. To the plaintiff in the case, it meant little as the defendant's failure to pay and the
indeterminancy of the ruling (as it wound its way through the appellate
courts) made enforcement of the ruling almost impossible. The litigant
would probably have preferred a more conventional alimony award in
the end, though that was not her initial desire. Law students must come
to understand that their experience of a legal case is likely to be very
different from the client's. This understanding of the legal system (from
the underside and client's side) may be just as important as understanding the rule of law and skills of the lawyer.
Finally, to what ends should the lawyer address her skills and understanding of the legal system? Clinical education was founded at a
time (for most schools in the 1960's) when the founders saw law as a tool
for social change. In these less optimistic times the question must still be
asked-is the lawyer simply a craftsperson using her skills as any technician or expert or should the lawyer's skills be used for particular ends?
In my view, the sort of study of the legal system in context suggested
above ought to provide the impetus, through scholarship, teaching and
practice, for the clinical teacher and law student to be active rather than
passive, in the search for legal and social change. My criticisms of
clinical education, leveled from two different places, both point to a
changing conception of the clinical law student's role. No longer fueled
by the social reform movements of the 1960's, clinical law students seek
simply to learn how to be lawyers and how to assimilate themselves to
the present legal system. In my view, if clinical education really is to
succeed as the flesh on the bones of legal education, it must help to identify the weaknesses of the legal system and the social structure in which it
is embedded in order to move toward progressive reforms and changes
both of the legal system and the larger society. Some clinical programs
have brought some of the major lawsuits decided in the last twenty
years. 3' Others have experimented with new forms of legal representation (student lawyers, computerized legal aid, interdisciplinary representation such as with lawyers and social workers or psychologists) or new
forms of legal services (mediation programs, night courts, client education programs for pro se representation, back-up research centers for law
See e.g. Northwestern's clinic involvement in several U.S. Supreme Court education cases,
University of Tennessee in environmental cases, and Georgetown, Rutgers and New York University
in women's rights cases as a few examples.
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reform cases, legislative advocacy and organizing.3 2 For clinical education to go beyond mere assimilation to the profession which apprenticeship offers, it must move the educational and professional enterprise
forward. To study and critique and change the legal profession and to
examine the social roles of lawyers is what clinical education should be
about, both in the teaching it offers students, and in the scholarship it
offers the academy and practicing lawyers.
CONCLUSION

Although my criticisms of clinical education may be somewhat contradictory, my hope is that we will be able to respond to both of them
simultaneously. We have begun to think of lawyering as its own subject
matter. As clinical education comes of age we are learning that the subject matter is far more complex than we imagined. We have approached
a time in which some of us will pursue one line of inquiry while others
explore a different course. Clinical education offers the promise of combining a professional education with a good liberal arts education-we
can study the many ways in which professional skills are put to use in
solving individual and society's problems. To do this properly we need
to be more rigorous about our teaching and our scholarship and explore
the many sources of information and data we have-our own cases, our
student's cases, our inside-but-outside views of the legal system at work.
Whether our individual goals as clinicians are to make better lawyers,
improve legal education or produce legal and social change, it is incumbent on us to press forward in both of the directions explored here.
Notwithstanding some of the apparent contradictions noted in this Article, clinical education can deliver on what I believe is its great promise;
to more fully educate our students and ourselves about what it means to
be a lawyer, by simultaneously improving our skills as lawyers and trying
to understand what it means to use those skills in our society.
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See e.g., programs at ITT-Chicago Kent (computer assisted advocacy), Southwestern, Ohio

State (night consumer court), Duke (mediation), Wisconsin (lay advocacy and back-up center) for
some examples of these innovations.

